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A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE THEORY, METHOD, AND LIMITA-
TIONS OF THE "LIE DETECTOR"
BENJAMIN BURACK
Benjamin Burack, Ph.D., is an Associate Professor of Psychology and Director of
the Laboratory of Experimental Psychology at Roosevelt University, Chicago. During
the war he served as a psychologist with the U. S. Army, and his research and study
has included the development of the electric logic machine for testing illogical think-
ing. He is a former president of the Chicago Division of the Illinois Psychological
Association and a fellow of the American Psychological Association and the American
Association for the Advancement of Science.-EDrroR.
The year 1954 showed increasing use of the machine called the "lie detector,"
also known as the "polygraph," "psychograph," "psychometer," "deceptograph,"
"reactograph," etc. In one northern city all the students in one high school were
asked to volunteer to take the test, concerning a student found murdered; until
school let out for summer, hundreds had been tested. In various cities the tests
are being admitted as court evidence for the first time. Newspaper editorials and
"letters to the editor" are increasingly urging and even demanding such tests.
The present article is a study of the theory, method, and limitations of the "lie
test" in criminal or other court cases, particularly in relation to suspects who may
happen to be innocent. Little or no consideration is given to methods of "beating"
the machine, already well described in the literature. Only major methods and princi-
ples are discussed. A multitude of minor variations have been developed but are not
considered here.
Basically, the "lie detector" simply indicates various physiological functions
(breathing, pulse, blood-pressure, sweating, etc.), as well as any sudden changes in
these functions. Such body functions become momentarily disturbed by either
physical stimuli or emotional stimuli. In "lie detection" work the machine detects,
not lies, but emotions. No machine exists which can detect the act of lying. The
machine merely detects the arousal of emotion, and only indirectly: it is not even
the mental or feeling aspect of emotion that is detected, but only the physiological
changes (modified breathing, faster pulse, increased blood-pressure, increased sweat-
ing, etc.) which immediately follow any sudden stress emotion. That the machine
does not depend upon lying can be indicated by the fact that it reveals the arousal
of emotion even when the person does not answer the crucial questions.
The appearance of the instrument which can indicate such physiological functions
depends on the particular function measured. To indicate breathing, an air-filled
rubber tube is placed around the person's chest. To indicate pulse and blood pres-
sure, a cloth band is wound around the upper arm. To indicate perspiration, two pads
are placed on the hand. Any machine which indicates several of these physiological
functions simultaneously is called a "polygraph," meaning literally "many pictures."
These physiological functions register on a moving strip of paper running across the
face of the machine.
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It should be mentioned again that any sudden stress emotion will bring about
these physiological changes. The emotion need not be fear, though that is the emotion
probably aroused in most lie detection work. Not only do various stress emotions
bring about physiological changes, but these changes seem to be the same for the
various stress emotions. In other words, there is no way of identifying the emotion
by study of the accompanying physiological changes. Furthermore, some of these
functions can be observed without a machine but less accurately. For example,
breathing can be observed visually, pulse can be felt by touching the wrist veins,
etc. The earliest recorded attempt to detect emotion was accomplished by Erasistratus
(300-250 B.C.), a court physician, who noticed that the pulse quickened during
cmotional states.
Wuy TEsT-SuBjEcTs BECOX&E EmOTIOnqAL
There are three main reasons, in relation to a crime, for a person becoming emo-
tionally aroused when taking a polygraph test.
1. Responsible guilt: the guilty suspect. If a guilty suspect lies when answering a
question relevant to the crime, he may fear that the machine will detect his lie. Any
such fear will be indicated on the machine as changes in the physiological functions
already described above. Even without speaking, a guilty person will usually experi-
ence stress emotion when he merely hears certain questions asked or certain details
of the crime mentioned, the reason being that he fears that his undue familiarity
will "show through" and register on the machine.
2. Guilty knowledge: the confidante or accomplice of the guilty person. If a con-
fidante or accomplice, familiar with the details of the crime, lies when answering a
question he too may fear detection of his lie. The physiological changes will register
on the machine.
3. Inwcent knowledge: the innocent suspect. An innocent person who answers a
question truthfully, but who recognizes (or guesses) that the question is relevant
to the crime, may show emotion for any of several reasons:
a. Fear that the machine may fail to affirm his innocence;
b. Sudden anger and resentment that he is suspected of this crime; or
c. Sudden acute distress or grief at the great personal loss he has sustained (if
the crime was murder of a member of his family, for example).
Thus, we see that emotional response to a specific question may indicate either
responsible guilt or guilty knowledge or innocent knowledge. The only thing all
three have in common is familiarity with certain details of the crime. If the person
can reasonably show how he became familiar with the critical details in some innocent
fashion, probably no valid test can be administered to him.
If the person can not reasonably show how he became familiar with the details of
the crime, then his emotional response to relevant questions leads us to infer undue
familiarity, based on either "guilty knowledge" or "responsible guilt." This is
probably as far as the test can go.
But even to go this far, it is necessary to design the questions (or spoken ideas)
in such a way that the innocent person would not recognize which items refer to the
crime (assuming of course that he has not learned of these details innocently), while
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the guilty person (or his accomplice or confidante) would recognize which items refer
to the crime.
Basically, there are two main designs for the series of questions. The first we shall
call the "disguised questions test," and the second we shall call the "undisguised
questions test."
THE DIsGUISED QUsTIoNs TEST
Where the important details of the crime have not become public knowledge by
way of newspapers, radio, daily conversation, etc., a reasonably valid test can be
given. This test consists of several groups of ideas. In each group only one idea con-
cerns an actual detail of the crime, a detail which could not be known to an innocent
person. This detail we call "relevant" while the other ideas in the group are "ir-
relevant." On the surface, all the ideas in each group must appear equally irrelevant
(or equally relevant) to an innocent suspect. When we compare the person's reactions
to the relevant question with his reactions to the irrelevant questions, we are using
the irrelevant questions as a kind of "control," a basis for comparison.
Suppose a gold watch was the only article stolen during a burglary in a home. The
following group of questions could be asked:
"Do you know whether a pearl necklace was stolen?"
"Do you know whether a diamond ring was stolen?"
"Do you know whether a gold watch was stolen?"
"Do you know whether a fur coat was stolen?"
"Do you know whether a silver bracelet was stolen?"
As a variation, instead of requiring the subject to answer the question we can
just speak the questions one at a time. Or we can merely speak the key words one
at a time: "pearl necklace," "diamond ring," "gold watch," "fur coat," "silver
bracelet." Regardless of the form used, there should be pauses of five to ten seconds
in-between the items. The form requiring answers to questions is probably best,
because a person with responsible guilt or guilty knowledge will fear detection of his
lie, in addition to fearing detection of his recognition of the one relevant item in
the group.
Some examiners permit the person to see the list of questions before asking them,
on the theory that knowing what will be asked serves to stimulate (in guilty persons)
greater emotional response to the one relevant question. Because the guilty person
builds up tension as the examiner approaches the anticipated relevant question, this
variation of the disguised questions test is sometimes called the "peak of tension
test."
There should be as many groups of questions as there are important details about
the crime that an innocent person would not be expected to know. Thus, the innocent
person will be safeguarded if he happens to show an emotional response to only one of
a number of relevant questions.
Great care must be used in interpreting the meaning of the test results. Greater
emotional response to all (or most) of the relevant questions (than to the irrelevant
ones in the same group) suggests an undue familiarity with the details of the crime
referred to in the relevant questions. But this apparently undue familiarity could
result from any of the following:
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1. Slier guessing, probably involuntarily. For example, an innocent suspect might
involuntarily guess that the stolen article in the list above was a fur coat, or the
diamond ring, or the gold watch. If he thus involuntarily assumes the article was one
of these items, he may show emotional response to that item. This probably happens
more frequently in the "peak of tension" variation, where he is first shown the
questions (before the test begins) and thus has (unfortunately for him) an opportunity
to guess at the relevant item. Whenever this happens, the person should inform the
examiner. But it is not likely that he will guess correctly more than one of the relevant
questionsi unless the questions are worded so poorly that they suggest the relevant
question in each group.
2. inocent kwwledge. If the person recognizes that some question refers to a
detail he has heard about, he should inform the examiner and explain exactly where or
how he has heard about this detail. As in the case of guessing mentioned above, it is
not likely that he will have heard about most of the details if the examiner has used
proper caution in eliminating details that have become public knowledge. If, how-
ever, the person can explain reasonably his familiarity with certain details men-
tioned in the test, those questions should be eliminated as invalid.
3. Guilty knowledge. This is the case with an accomplice or confidante of the guilty
person. Such accomplice or confidante can of course confess the reason for his
familiarity.
4. Responsible guilt: the guilty person.
Thus we see that even when we disguise the questions so that on the surface the
relevant one in each group does not appear to be any more relevant than the ir-
relevant questions, various inferences are possible. Narrowing the inferences down to
the inference of responsible guilt would require elimination of every relevant detail
that a non-guilty person can reasonably explain his familiarity with. This must be
lone in. order to give the person the benefit of the doubt. Since inference of guilt
increases in reliability when based on several groups of questions, the risk of inferring
guilt on the basis of one or two groups of questions is too high. In such cases, where
only one or two details are available for use in relevant questions, it is better to
declare that no valid disguised questions test can be administered to this person.
THE UNDISGUISED QUESTIONS TEST
Much (if not most) "lie detection" testing today uses undisguised questions. This
becomes almost inevitable if the important details of the crime become public
knowledge -before the test can be given, or if these details are unwittingly revealed
to the suspect when he is arrested, or during the interrogation process by detectives.
Also, it is much more difficult to formulate a disguised questions test than an undis-
guised questions test. Finally, we must recognize that undisguised questions have the
irresistible appeal of going directly to the "heart of the matter": "Did you kill -?"
or "Did you steal this watch?," etc.
As originally used, the undisguised questions test was simply a group of questions
in which .some were obviously relevant to the crime while the others were obviously
irrelevant-.to the crime. As with the disguised questions test discussed previously,
the irrelevant questions were the control questions against which the person's
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response to relevant questions was compared. If the person showed greater emotional
response to the relevant questions, he was assumed to be lying.
After some years it became evident, both logically and from practical experience,
that undisguised irrelevant questions were, by themselves, an inadequate comparison-
control for undisguised relevant questions-that innocent suspects often become
emotional when asked implicating questions. No study has ever shown that innocent
suspects invariably show less emotion than guilty suspects when asked obviously
implicating questions. So the more sophisticated lie detector examiners began to
add other "logical" controls. And this story of the search for controls to support
a shaky structure brings us to the uncertainty that much "lie-detection" work finds
itself in today. All references in the remainder of this article, except where otherwise
indicated, refer to two of the leading books in the field.'
Suppose that Joe "Red" Blake is suspected of the murder of John Jones, last
Saturday night, and of the theft of Jones' watch. (Inbau-Reid, pages 13-22). The
following type of test is suggested:
1. Are you in Chicago now? (irrelevant question)
2. Have you ever been called "Red"? (irrelevant question)
3. Do you know who shot John Jones? (relevant question)
4. Do you ever smoke? (irrelevant question)
5. Did you shoot John Jones last Saturday night? (relevant question)
6. Did you ever steal anything? (added "control question")
7. Are you wearing glasses now? (irrelevant question)
8. About two months ago, did you shoot Jim Smith at First and Main Streets? (added
fictitious "guilt complex question")
9. Did you steal John Jones' watch last Saturday night? (relevant question)
10. Did you have a coat with you today? (irrelevant question)
The relevant questions are numbers 3, 5, 9, and are obviously undisguised. They
strike directly at the heart of the matter. The irrelevant questions are numbers 1,
2, 4, 7, 10, and are also obviously undisguised. It should be noted that even the
irrelevant questions have been carefully chosen by the examiner. They are such that
the examiner knows the correct answers. Otherwise, a guilty suspect could try to
"beat the machine" by lying to all questions and thus cause emotional reactions on
every question. Such a record would look like a general pattern of nervousness. If
the suspect lies to the irrelevant questions (to beat the machine), the examiner will
certainly mention this in his report; also he can inform the suspect of this and then
repeat the test, giving the suspect another chance. When the suspect answers the
irrelevant questions truthfully, the examiner has the first basis of comparison, in the
difference between emotional response to relevant and irrelevant questions.
But because of the already mentioned limitation, that innocent persons, too, may
respond more greatly to obvious relevant questions, new controls are added. Questions
6 and 8 are added controls which purport to provide a "double check" upon the sus-
pect's response to the relevant questions.
I LN AU, F. E. AND REID, J. E. LiE DLTEcrTioN AND CRIMINAL INTERROGATIOx. Williams & Wilkins
Company, Baltimore, 1953. LEE, CLARIENcE D. TEm INSTRUmJENT.AL D=CTio or DcEPno-
mx LIE TEST. C. C Thomas Company, Springfield, Ill., 1953.
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The purpose of Question 6 (Did you ever steal anything?) is not to learn about the
control incident (that is, whether the suspect ever stole anything), but rather to
establish a situation in which he will lie. If the suspect answers "no," it is momentarily
assumed that he is lying, on the assumption that everybody has stolen some trivial
thing in a lifetime, even if only in childhood. To protect the suspect against the
possibility that he was truthful in such a denial, he is asked later (after the test)
whether he was really telling the truth. If he insists that he was, the test is repeated,
and some other question is asked, to which he may lie. If necessary, he will be told to
lie in answer to some personal question. As a last resort, he can be given the "card
test." In the card test, he is shown about half a dozen playing cards or numbered
cards, and told to think of one of them. He is then told that when the examiner
reads off each one, he is to say "No, that's not the one" each time. Thus he will
lie once, and the machine will indicate an emotional response at the correct card
(in a high percentage of cases). For control purposes, however, Inbau-Reid state
that it is far less dependable than the general control question.
Now, what is the purpose of getting the person to lie in the test situation? This lie
supplies an emotional reaction for control-comparison with the emotional reaction
to the questions relevant to the crime. If his lie-reaction to the "control question"
is equal to or greater than his reaction to the relevant questions, he is considered to
be answering the relevant questions truthfully, apparently on the assumption that
an innocent person will react emotionally to the forced lie. But if his lie-reaction to the
"control question" is less than his reaction to the relevant questions, he is considered
to be answering the relevant questions untruthfully, on the assumption that a guilty
person will react less emotionally to the forced lie. Note, however, that actually all
that may happen in the latter instance is that an innocent person may show less
emotion when lying about a relatively trivial matter than when confronted with
critical questions serious enough to imprison him or even take away his life!
It is interesting to note that Lee recommends this question for a different purpose.
When a person shows no reaction to the undisguised relevant questions, there is a
remote possibility that he may be guilty but just does not respond emotionally to
any questions. So Lee recommends that the special control question be used. Then, if
the suspect reacts emotionally to the control question (required lie), he is "responsive"
and is considered to show innocence on his original test. But if he shows no emotional
reaction, he is a "non-responsive" subject and his original test results are considered
"indefinite" (Lee, p. 107).
Question 8 (About two months ago, did you shoot Jim Smith at First and Main
Streets?) is a similar control, in the form of a fictitious "guilt complex" question.
In a sense it accuses the person of a second crime which (unknown to him) never
even happened, for the purpose of arousing some emotional reaction (even though he
truthfully answers "no."). It provides an opportunity to see whether the person
shows greater emotion on the questions relevant to the actual crime. If his reaction
to this control question is greater than or equal to his reaction to the actual crime
questions, he is considered to be innocent; he is showing innocent nervousness
("guilt complex") toward both crimes. But if his reaction 'to this false "accusation"
is less than his reaction to the relevant questions, he is considered to be guilty.
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Note, however, that the fictitious crime charge should be as plausible as the actual
crime charge. That this is doubtful is reflected by the use of three times as many
actual crime questions (at least in the example furnished above), by the chance that
the actual crime has already become public knowledge, etc.
Lee adds a control of his own: The use of both "major" relevant questions and
"secondary" relevant questions. Whereas "Did you kill White?" is major, "Did you
hit White with a lead pipe?" is considered to be secondary. If the person reacts to
major and secondary questions, he is considered to be guilty, on the supposition
that all questions are threatening to a guilty person. If he reacts to major questions
but not to secondary questions, then he is considered innocent, on the supposition that
secondary implications are relatively meaningless or unthreatening to an innocent
person (p. 84). As with most controls described thus far, the logic or rationale is
arbitrary and not backed up by any kind of experimentation or research on the
specific control.
Unfortunately, many examiners persist in using the undisguised questions test in
spite of its shaky foundation with or without added "controls." For example, Trovillo
flatly claims that it has been verified that innocent persons do not react more to
undisguised relevant questions than to irrelevant ones, as guilty persons do.2
But when we examine the kind of "verification" referred to, we notice for example
that after a theft of $100 in a dormitory house, (1) about 9% of innocent students
did react more to the relevant questions, (2) the results can refer only to persons
of above average education, (3) no person was "suspect" or "on the spot," each seeing
himself only as one of 81 persons volunteering to take the test, and (4) the results do
not apply to instances where the charge is murder, not a $100 theft.
That some experienced examiners do recognize the limitation of the undisguised
questions test (even with its various "controls") is reflected by the following com-
ments by Lee: "The type of case wherein the details have been withheld from the
suspect are relatively rare.. . ." "In interrogating the suspect, they often unwittingly
reveal the highlights of the crime, thereby depriving the psychograph examiner of his
best weapon in case a deception test becomes necessary" (pp. 95-96). The "best
weapon" is, of course, the disguised questions test. Lee further affirms that the
"Peak of Tension Test" (disguised questions test) will "more clearly differentiate
between guilt and innocence" (p. 195).
Thus, rather than rely on questionable test-procedures, it would be better to use
all the ingenuity required to formulate a disguised questions test. The best prepa-
ration would be to ask the suspect what he knows about the offense, and then question
him further as to whether he knows of other details. For example: "Do you know
what time the victim died?", "Do you know how she died?", etc. Then each detail
for which the suspect denies knowledge can be used as part of a disguised questions
test. Lee proposes an excellent systematic set of items concerning crimes, from which
an examinir could select those relevant to the particular crime committed and which
the suspect denies knowledge of. Lee even presents groups of suitable questions for
2BTTERm, M. E. AN T MARCUS, F. L., Cardio-vascular responses of innocent persons to crim-
inal interrogation. Asra-IcA JOURNAL OF PSYCHOLOGY, 1947, Vol. 60, pp. 407-12. TRovrmo, P. V.,
Scientific proof of credibility. TExNESSEE LAw REv Ew, 1953, Vol. 22, page 753.
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each relevant item (with a few lapses into occasional use of undisguised questions),
so that a valid disguised questions test can be formulated (pp. 195-217).
Accu nAc op =n "LIE DEr.CToR" TESTS
Where later confessions of guilt or confirmations of innocence have provided a
check upon the validity of the lie detector test results, we find claims varying any-
where from 80 % to 100 % accuracy. But when we look for a scientific report based on
reasonable statistical and experimental principles, some confusion is evident. For an
example, let us examine the accuracy report presented in a leading text already
referred to.
The statistics, based on criminal offenses only, are as follows: (Inbau and Reid,
p. 111).
Lie-detector test indicated as "guilty": 1334 31.1%
Lie-detector test indicated as "innocent": 2759 64.5%
Total number of definite diagnoses made: 4093 95.6%
Lie-detector test was "indefinite": 187 4.4%
Total number of cases: 4280 100.0%
Number of guilt-diagnoses later confirmed: 486
Number of innocence-diagnoses later confirmed: 323
Total number of correct diagnoses known: 809
Number of verified errors: 3 (in 4093 definite diagnoses) = .0007 %
Now we will demonstrate the inadequacy of these results:
1. The percentage of verified errors should read .07%, not .0007%. (3 out of
4093 = .0007 = .07%).
2. The 3 verified errors should have been divided by the 812 verified cases (809
correct diagnoses plus 3 erroneous diagnoses), thus yielding .004, or .4%. (We do not
know the amount of error in the several thousand unverified cases; see paragraphs
4 and 5, below.)
3. Since only 812 definite follow-ups are reported, what of the remaining 3281
definite diagnoses made? If even as few as 37 of these 3281 unverified diagnoses were
erroneous, the error (when we add the 3 verified errors) rises to .01 (40 out of 4093),
or 1%. If 406 unverified diagnoses were wrong, the error rises to .10 (409 out of
4093), or 10%.
4. Now, since we are more concerned here with an innocent person being diagnosed
as guilty, than a guilty person being diagnosed as innocent, we must know particularly
the amount of error in the group diagnosed as "guilty." But here the same frustrating
situation faces us. Of the 1334 diagnoses of "guilty," only 486 were verified as guilty.
What of the remaining 848 cases? Even assuming that the 3 verified errors were for
"innocence" diagnoses, if as few as 13 of the 848 unverified "guilty" diagnoses were
erroneous, the error is .01 (13 out of 1334), or 1%. If 133 of these 848 were erroneous,
the error rises to .10 (133 out of 1334), or 10%.
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Note, however, that unless it can be shown that unverified diagnoses are likely to
be more erroneous than are verified diagnoses, we have to accept the Reid-Inbau
figure of over 99% accuracy. This could well be made the model of what is attainable
when guilt detection is in the hands of expert examiners.
It would be unfortunate if the 99% figure became an assumed accuracy-level for
all polygraph work. Some agencies have reported accuracy figures as low as 80%.
Also note that the private nature of polygraph tests does not make ethically possible
any independent inspection of test data and follow-ups, for possible errors, as has
been done in medical and other scientific research of a controversial nature. There-
fore, all polygraph agencies doing research on accuracy have the responsibility of
using experimental and statistical consultants for such research.
LACK OF EDUCATIONAL AND TRAmNG STADARns
As for basic qualifications, there appear to be no agreed-upon minimum standards
of intelligence, education and training. This is understandable, however, in a field
which is relatively new. Inbau and Reid suggest above-average intelligence, prefera-
bly some college training (but no mention of college psychology or physiology
courses), and at least 6 months intensive training in a testing agency (p. 114-115).
Trovillo (in the article already cited) recommends a minimum education of a four-
year college degree, with a major in psychology or physiology (p. 764). A professional
association of polygraph experts would be a good step toward setting up minimum
standards. The International Society for the Detection of Deception, founded in
1945, has not established such standards. The recently formed American Academy
of Polygraph Examiners (September, 1954) offers much promise by requiring a
college degree or equivalent, as well as demonstrated competence and integrity or an
active research interest.
UNETHICAL PRACTICES
Sometimes unproved accusations are made against the person. Inbau and Reid
suggest that if the first test's results are vague and indefinite, "the examiner, for
purposes of stimulation, should accuse the subject of lying about the principal
offense" and then administer a re-test (p. 19-20). Lee similarly suggests that when
a person shows no reaction to either the relevant questions or the required lie (control
question), the examiner "pretends that the record convinces him of the suspect's
guilt and accuses him outright of lying, and then proceeds in an attempt to induce
him to confess" (p. 107-108). Lee adds: "Some may question the ethics of such
procedure; but in the type of crime in which the test usually is applied, it would seem
that the interests of justice outweighs the consideration of ethics, especially in this
country where defendant's legal rights are so thoroughly protected" (p. 187).
Probably the lowest form of interrogation consists of the asking of highly embar-
rassing personal questions, to establish an emotional reaction for control-comparison
purposes. Inbau and Reid, who condemn this practice, describe how it recently
brought forth the statement by a United States senator that "if the use of the lie
detector technique as an employment testing procedure was not abandoned by
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federal agencies he would introduce legislation to outlaw its use".3 They add that
subsequently the U. S. Defense Department announced that "lie detection applicant
testing would be abandoned within the Department" (p. 23).
Scmmmric RECOGNITION
Legal recognition of a test involving a mechanical device almost inevitably in-
volves scientific recognition of such a test. Up to the present time, no official recogni-
tion of the "lie detector" has come from either of the two scientific groups most
familiar with the machine: psychologists and physiologists. This does not imply dis-
approval, however; scientific bodies rarely take a stand on a test.
Aside from the professional societies, individual psychologists and physiologists
have been somewhat doubtful about "lie detector tests." These doubts usually do not
reflect on the machine itself. The machine has been found to be accurate as regards
detecting the several physiological functions and sudden changes. The problem is
in the interpretation of test results.
The proponents of the tests have presented arguments which seem to be contra-
dictory. On the one hand, they have admitted the scientific limitations and judicial
hazards. But on the other hand, they have scorned scientific criticisms and have
urged admissibility of the test results as judicial evidence. Let us examine both of
these views. All quotations below are taken from Inbau-Refd.
LIE DETECTION EXPERTS' ARGUMENTS AGAINST
"First of all, consideration must be given to the fact that the technique is still in a
relatively early stage of development. It has not yet become standardized as to test
procedure, examiner qualifications, or even instrumentation itself. Much more re-
mains to be done and accomplished before the courts should be urged to generally
admit test results as evidence" (p. 127-128).
"If lie detector test results were admitted as legal evidence they would be offered
and treated as proof of some very important phase of the case, usually the validity of
the entire claim or contention of one of theparties. There would then bea tendency on
the part of many judges and juries to accord conclusive weight and significance to
the test results." In other words, polygraph evidence "would usually bear upon the
crux of the whole case-e.g., is the defendant lying when he denies killing the deceased;
if he is, then he is guilty; if he is telling the truth, then he must be innocent" (p. 129).
Because test results interpretation has not been standardized, the authors state
that "courts would be unable to properly determine whether or not the results of some
particular test should be admitted in evidence." "A judge or jury ordinarily would
have no opportunity to observe and understand the basis for the witness' opinion,
because even if the recordings are produced in court they are frequently of such a
nature that in the average case one witness could point out what he considers indi-
cations of deception while another with perhaps equal effectiveness could point out
on the same records what he considers the indications of truthfulness" (p. 129).
"Moreover, the essential qualifications for competent examiners have not been
3 CoNGREssIoNAL R coRD, Jan. 17, 1952, Vol. 98, Part 1, pp. 258-262.
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well enough established to permit a court to determine whether or not a certain
examiner should be permitted to testify as an expert" (p. 129).
The authors conclude that ".... we should not be too hasty in our own acceptance
of proposed innovations. In the case of the lie-detector technique such a cautious
attitude will operate not only in the best interests of the administration of justice
but also to the ultimate advantage of the technique itself. A premature acceptance
of the test results as legal evidence would undoubtedly occasion such a series of
abuses and miscarriages of justice as to stigmatize forever the technique in the field
of law as well as of science. It seems much wiser, therefore, to await a further de-
velopment and standardization of the technique before admitting the test results
as evidence in civil or criminal cases" (p. 131-132).
Only about 50% of deception examiners in a national survey in 1953 thought that
the test should be used as evidence in court trials. 4
In spite of these doubts and cautions by the professional lie detection examiners
themselves, at other times they scorn scientific criticism and urge admissibility of
the test results as judicial evidence.
LIE DETECTION EXPERTS' ARGUMENTS FOR
Inbau and Reid, for example, feel that the psychology and physiology professions
generally "have not been sufficiently interested" and are "not prepared to offer an
authoritative opinion upon the subject."
An example closer to scorn and arrogance is the statement, by Lee, that the
refined techniques and standardized criteria of the specialists in this field "seem
to have gone beyond the understanding of the academicians" (p. 22). Similarly, Lee
ridicules the view by psychologists that the diagnosis of "lying" is only an inference
(p. 24). This in spite of the fact that Leonarde Keeler, whom Lee acknowledges as an
authority, warned that . .. there is no such thing as a 'lie-detector.' There are no
instruments... that deserve the name 'lie-detector' any more than a stethoscope, a
clinical thermometer, or a blood count apparatus with a microscope can be called an
'appendicitis detector'." 5 In other words, instruments lead to diagnoses, and diagnoses
are inferences.
An example of the anti-academic approach that probably alienates academic
cooperation is the following type of exaggeration and ridicule: "Simulated emotion
in psychology classes on the lecture platform, in drama, and in experimental labora-
tories has done more to clutter up and confuse honest polygraphic reporting than all
the quackery of 50 years." and "The professor who buries his nose in textbooks and
bores his students with myopic dronings over verbal autopsies will never be inter-
ested in conducting vital research in lie detection" (Trovillo, p. 747 and 762).
As a safeguard, Inbau and Reid would restrict the use of the polygraph to one
specific situation: where the opposing attorneys are themselves doubtful of their
clients' guilt, agree that the test be given, and stipulate in advance that the results
4 CuREToN, E. E. A concensus as to the validity of polygraph procedures. TENNEsSEE LAW RE-
vixw, 1953, Vol. 22, pages 728-742.
5K IrYx, L. Debunking the "lie-detector". JourNAL oF CRnaLx. LAW A-\D CRzM'oIooGY,
1934, Vol. 25, p. 153.
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be entdred as evidence (page 132). They mention the appellate court decision (in
California in 1948) which upheld the lower trial court's acceptance of the test results
as evidence, based on previous agreement and stipulation.6
LEGAL STATUS OP TH= "LiE DETECTOR" TEST
In several states, trial courts have admitted the test results as evidence. However,
whenever appeal was made to a higher court, the higher courts usually have held that
the test results are not admissible7 Public confidence in the "lie detector" is increas-
ing. More and more demands are being made that the machine be used in civil and
criminal cases.
Neither the public nor its juries and judges are sufficiently familiar with the limita-
tions of the polygraph test and with the legitimate concerns regarding reports of
extremely high accuracy-statistics. We can expect to see a slow but steady movement
toward making the test compulsory. Lee feels that "an ideal situation would be to
make it a rule that when a suspect denies his guilt at the outset, he be referred at
once to the psych lab without further ado" (pi. 96).
In various commercial organizations the test is already compulsory. It is being
used to test employees of banks, department stores, chain stores, etc., in one or more
of three ways.
1. Pre-employment test" primarily to determine whether the applicant stole any-
thing from his previous employer.
2. Periodic check-up: to determine whether employees have stolen anything during
the last year (or two-year period, etc.).
3. Emergency test: where a substantial theft has occurred in the bank or store.
Even refusal (by an innocent person) to take the test offers no real protection, for
such refusal has come to imply guilt, at least in the eyes of the examiners. As one
says: "What implication does such refusal carry other than of guilt?" (Lee, p. 185).
CONCLUSIONS
1. The machine used in polygraph work is extremely accurate mechanically and is
probably almost as good now as it ever will be.
2. This machine measures only physiological functions and any sudden changes in
these functions.
3. These physiological changes in an interrogation test-situation undoubtedly
reflect the arousal of emotion.
4. The "undisguised questions test," with or without various controls, has little
logical validity.
5. The "disguised questions test," when used for a person who could not reason-
ably be expected to be familiar with certain details of the offense, has logical validity.
6. The commercial, governmental, and scientific "lie detection" examiners still
have no accepted standards of educational and training requirements for competency.
6 People v. Houser, Calif. Dist. Court of Appeals (4th) CALlroxaL APPx.A, 2nd Series, 1948,
Vol. 85, p. 686. (abstracted in PAc.iFc RxEPoax , 2nd series, 1948, Vol. 193, p. 937).
7 Stone v. Earp, Michigan Supreme Court, McmoAN REPoms, 1951, Vol. 331, p. 606. (abstracted
n Nomrrm uzs ,; REPORTER, 2nd series, 1951, Vol. 50, p. 172).
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7. There is still a fairly common insensitivity to certain unethical practices in
polygraph work.
RECOMMENDATIONS
1. That the newly established American Academy of Polygraph Examiners main-
tain adequate educational and training standards, and that only members of the
academy be used by courts for the purpose of administering polygraph tests.
2. That examiners, using the best methodological and statistical techniques known
today, initiate separate research investigations on the accuracy of the "disguised
questions test" as compared with the "undisguised questions test."
3. That the "disguised questions test" be used when the suspect requests it and
if he could not reasonably be expected to be familiar with certain details of the
offense.
4. That when a test is used, juries and judges be clearly informed of its limita-
tions, particularly if it was an "undisguised questions test."
5. That the term "lie detector" and all variations of it not be used whenever
possible and that the following terms be substituted: "polygraph," "polygraph test,"
"polygraph study," etc.
